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In tbia cue, the Delaware Supreme Court revened reapondeDt 'William Fensterer'a conviction Oil the poouDda that
the .,tmjesioft of the opiDiOil teediDOIQ' of the proeecution'a
expert witaela, who wu UDable to recall the buia for hia
opinion, denied reapoDdent hia Sixth A.mendmeat rl&ht to
coalroDt tbe witDaaaaa apiDst bim. 498 A. lrl • (1886).
We coaclude tbat the Delaware Supreme Court milcoDitraed
the CoDfroDtadon ClauBe .. interpreted bJ the declakn of

tbil Court.

........-was

I
COilVicted of murderiDa bia lance, Stephallie .bD Swift. The State's cue waa baaed OD c:ileaJMtn·
till evldeace, llld proceeded on the theory that reepcmdent
W ........ Swift with a cat leash. To eetahllab that. tlle
. t IIMia ... the murder weapon. the State aoqht. to prove
Iiiii& twlattn foaDd Oil the leash were atmDv to Swlrea hair,
_.__,...._..... • fA thole balra hid heeD forel'b1J nmo~ To
...... the State relied Oil tM teltbmllr fll

aa.a a. ........,. or the PldiM ._.. . .,
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fense counsel's cross-examination of the Agent was nothing
more than an exercise in futility:• Ibid. Since the court
could not rule out the possibility that Robillard could have
been "completely discredited" had he committed himself as to
the theory on which his conclusion was based, it held that respondent "was denied his right to effectively cross-examine a
key state ·witness." Ibid. Accordingly, the court reversed
without reaching respondent's additional claim that
Robillard's testimony was inadmissible under the pertinent
Delaware Rules of Evidence. We now reverse the Delaware
Supreme Court's holding that Agent Robillard's inability to
recall the method whereby he arrived at his opinion rendered
the admission of that opinion violative of respondent's rights
under the Confrontation Clause.
II
This Court's Confrontation Clause cases fall into two broad

categories: cases involving the admission of out-of-court
statements and cases involving restrictions imposed by law
or by the trial court on the scope of cross-examination. The
first category reflects the Court's longstanding recognition
that the "literal right to 'confront' the witness at the time of
trial . . . forms the core of the values furthered by the Confrontation Clause." California v. Green, 399 U . S. 149, 157
(1970). Cases such as Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U. S. 56 (1980),
and Dutton v. Evans, 400 U. S. 74 (1970), gave rise to Confrontation Clause issues "because hearsay evidence was admitted as substantive evidence against the defendants."
Tennessee v. Street, 471 U. S. - - , - - (1985). Cf. Bruton
v. United States, 391 U. S. 123 (1968).
The second category of cases is exemplified by Davis v.
Alaska, 415 U. S. 308, 318 (1974), in which, although some
cross-examination of a prosecution witness was allowed the
~rial court did not permit defense counsel to "expose t~ the
Jury the facts from which jurors, as the sole triers of fact and
credibility, could appropriately draw inferences relating to
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the defense might wish. See Roberts, 448 U. S., at 73, n. 12
(even where the only opportunity the defense has to crossexamine the declarant is at a preliminary hearing, except in
"extraordinary cases" where defense counsel provided ineffective representation at the earlier proceeding, "no inquiry
into 'effectiveness' is required"). This conclusion is confirmed by the fact that the assurances of reliability our cases
have found in the right of cross-examination are fully satisfied in cases such as this one, notwithstanding the witness'
inability to recall the basis for his opinion: the factfinder can
observe the witness' demeanor under cross-examination, and
the witness is testifying under oath and in the presence of the
accused. See id., at 63, n. 6.
We need not decide whether there are circumstances in
which a witness' lapse of memory may so frustrate any opportunity for cross-examination that admission of the witness' direct testimony violates the Confrontation Clause. In this
case, defense counsel's cross-examination of Agent Robillard
demonstrated to the jury that Robillard could not even recall
the theory on which his opinion was based. Moreover,
through its own expert witness, the defense was able to suggest to the jury that Robillard had relied on a theory which
the defense expert considered baseless. The Confrontation
Clause certainly requires no more than this.
Although Green, supra, involved a witness who professed
a lapse of memory on the stand, that case lends no support to
respondent. In pertinent part, Green was a case in which a
minor named Porter informed a police officer of a transaction
in which he claimed Green supplied him with drugs. At
trial, Porter professed to be unable to recall how he obtained
the drugs. The prosecution then introduced Porter's prior
inconsistent statements as substantive evidence. Green, 399
U. S., at 152. This Court held that "the Confrontation
Clause does not require excluding from evidence the prior
statements of a witness who concedes making the statements, and who may be asked to defend or otherwise explain
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the inconsistency between hls prior and his present version of
the events in question, thus opening himself to full crossexamination at trial as to both stories." I d., at 164. However, the Court also concluded that, in the posture of that
case, it would be premature to reach the question "[w]hether
Porter's apparent lapse of memory so affected Green's right
to cross-examine as to make a critical difference in the application of the Confrontation Clause . . .. " I d., at 168. In
this connection, the Court noted that even some who argue
that "prior statements should be admissible as substantive
evidence" believe that this rule should not apply to "the case
of a witness who disclaims all present knowledge of the ultimate event," because "in such a case the opportunities for
testing the prior statement through cross-examination at
trial may be significantly diminished." /d., at 169, n. 18 (citations omitted).
We need not decide today the question raised but not resolved in Green. As Green's framing of that question indicates, the issue arises only where a "prior statement," not itself subjected to cross-examination and the other safeguards
of testimony at trial, is admitted as substantive evidence.
Since there is no such out-of-court statement in this case, the
adequacy of a later opportunity to cross-examine, as a substitute for cross-examination at the time the declaration was
made, is not in question here.
Under the Court's cases, then, Agent Robillard's inability
to recall on the stand the basis for his opinion presents none
of the perils from which the Confrontation Clause protects
defendants in criminal proceedings. The Confrontation
Clause includes no guarantee that every witness called by the
prosecution will refrain from giving testimony that is marred
by forgetfulness, confusion, or evasion. To the contrary, the
{ Confrontation Clause is generally satisfied when the defense
is given a full and fair opportunity to probe and expose these
infinnities through cross-examination, thereby calling to the
attention of the factfinder the reasons for giving scant weight

'

to lht• w:itrws!l' tt•st imcmy . A,·~nl'clini)'h• we• hold t hut t hc• rul·
_,
~".
nuss1on into cvidf'llCt' nf Agt•nt 1\uhilhu·d 's opinion did not ul'•
fend tht' Conti·ontnt hm Chu1sc• clc•spitc• his innhilit y tn ,.,.,•nll
the basis fnr that opinion.
Tht! Delawnn• Sup•·emt' f"nm·t nlsu nppmu·H tn hnvc• he·
lieved that tht• prosecution l.n·ent•hc d its "sc•l'inu~ nhlignt inn
not to obstruct n rriminul dt•fcndnnt 'R t'l'nl'\s c•xuminntion ut'
t'-Xp~rt tt'stimony.'' 4H3 A . ~d . ut Ht';;l, s t•c•ming ly hc•t•nusc tlw
prosel'Ution knew in ndvnncc thnt A~t.mt Hohilhml woulcl h u
urmblc to recall th~ busis for his opinion wtu.•n he t e~tit\ccl nt.
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trial. While we would ugrt't' thut Robilhu·d'H ll•stimony nt
the t•oir dire t•xnminution must bt:• taken to huVl' nlt.ll'tl•d both
the prosecution und tht' defenst• to hit' lupsc of memory, sec
App. to Brief in Opposition A- 1, we do not think the prosecution was obliged to refruin from calling Robillard unless it

could somehow refresh his recollection. Whether or not,
under state law, Robillard's opinion should have been admitted into evidence, nothing in the J."ederal Constitution forbids
the conclusion reached by the trial court in this case: that the
expert's inability to recall the basis for his opinion went to the
weight of the evidence, not its admissibility. See United
States v. Bastanipour, 697 F. 2d 170, 176- 177 (CA7 1982),
cert. denied, 460 U. S. 1091 (1983). That being so, the prosecution's foreknowledge that its expert would be unable to
give the precise basis for his opinion did not impose an obligation on it, as a matter of due process, to refrain from introducing the expert's testimony unless the basis for that testimony could definitely be ascertained. We need not decide
whether the introduction of an expert opinion with no basis
could ever be so lacking in reliability, and so prejudicial, as to
deny a defendant a fair trial. The testimony of Dr. DeForest, suggesting the actual basis for Robillard's opinion and
vigorously disputing its validity, utterly dispels any possibility of such a claim in this case.

The petition for certiorari is granted, the judgment of the
Delaware Supreme Court is reversed, and the case is re- .

